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Abstract 
From the upper echelons perspective, we investigate the financial leverage decision of publicly listed companies in Bursa 
Malaysia for the period from 2002 to 2011. Using pooled OLS and fixed-effect regressions, we examine the impacts of CEO 
personal characteristics on financial leverage. Our measures of CEO personal characteristics such as CEO overconfidence based 
on CEO profile photo, CEO age, and CEO prior experience are significantly and negatively related to leverage. However, CEO 
education level and CEO tenure are significantly and positively related to leverage. Furthermore, we partition our sample of 
companies based on CEO age and CEO education level. In the CEO-age group, we find that female CEOs are greater risk takers 
as compared to male CEOs in Malaysia. With respect to CEO education level, we show that younger CEOs, female CEOs, and 
longer-serving CEOs are risk takers and more aggressive. This paper contributes to the debate of the UET as well as determinants 
of leverage decision from several dimensions. First, this is the first study that investigates the impacts of CEO personal 
characteristics on financial leverage of Malaysian firms. Second, we make the first attempt by classifying CEO certain 
characteristic (age and educational level) into groups to make a further comparison on the impact of CEO personal characteristics 
on financial leverage. Third, this study uses a larger data sample and a longer study period than the previous studies in the 
literature. Fourth, the paper also makes a methodological contribution. This study employs different methods (pooled OLS 
regression and fixed effects panel regression) for the analysis. It is hoped that the result of this paper can fill the gap of the 
literature on the relationship between CEO personal characteristics and financial leverage as explained by Upper Echelon Theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Based on Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) seminal work in leverage decision, academicians studying leverage 
decision have been trying to examine determinants of a firm’s financial leverage (Myers 1984). Two main theories 
are currently available in the leverage decision studies: the trade-off theory (TOT) (Miller 1977) and the pecking 
order theory (POT) (Myers 1984, Myers and Majluf 1984). Studies on leverage decision have been conducted in 
different countries: United States (Titman and Wessels 1988);  Asia-Pacific region (Deesomsak et al 2004); Latin 
American firms (Céspedes et al 2010). However, many existing empirical studies do not incorporate human factors 
in studying determinants of firms’ financial leverage. An emerging body of finance literature considers bounded 
rationality and associated behaviors of decision makers as attributes of financial phenomena (Subrahmanyam 2008). 
Additionally, Oliver (2005) states that an individual manager’s characteristics may play a role in a firm’s financial 
leverage. The Upper-Echelon Theory (UET) explains this phenomenon in the behavioral finance study. 
 
The UET states that the managerial background traits or characteristics estimate organizational outcomes, 
planned choices and the performance levels (Hambrick and Mason 1984). The theory suggests that the more 
complex a decision, for example strategic measures, the more important the personal characteristics of the decisions 
makers, such as age, tenure and specialization. The principle of the UET recognizes that top managers’ different 
characteristics such as age or career experiences affect their decisions on strategy and structure and it will directly 
affect firm’s strategic choice and organizational performance (Nielsen 2010).  Furthermore, the UET emphasizes 
that leaders characterized by bounded rationality will make a decision based on their cognitive, social and 
physiological characteristics. The diagram below explains how upper echelon characteristics affect corporate 
strategic choices. 
 
 
Fig.1. Upper echelons perspective of organizations 
Source: Hambrick and Mason (1984) 
 
Numerous researches have been carried out on the UET, examining the relationship between leader 
demographics and organizational outcomes such as innovation (Kitchell 1997), R&D spending (Barker and Mueller 
2002), corporate disclosure (Bamber et al 2010), firm performance (Weinzimmer 1997), and cash holding (Orens 
and Reheul 2013). However, the empirical significance of these studies remains largely unknown especially in terms 
of the relationship between a leader’s cognitive, social and psychological characteristics and financial leverage. In 
Malaysia, such research is understudied. Thus, this paper attempts to bridge the gap by exploring the effects of 
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human, particularly CEO personal characteristics on financial leverage in the Malaysian context. Furthermore, the 
study will further examine the preference of CEO in their corporate financing decision based on two classifications 
(CEO age group and educational background). 
 
This paper contributes to the debate of the UET as well as determinants of leverage decision from several 
dimensions. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that investigates the impacts of CEO personal 
characteristics on financial leverage of Malaysian firms. Second, we make the first attempt by classifying CEO 
certain characteristic (age and educational level) into groups to make a further comparison on the impact of CEO 
personal characteristics on financial leverage. Third, this study uses a larger data sample and a longer study period 
than the previous studies in the literature. Fourth, the paper also makes a methodological contribution. This study 
employs different methods (pooled OLS regression and fixed effects panel regression) for the analysis.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes 
the data and methodology used in this study, while Section 4 presents our empirical findings and discussion. Finally, 
conclusions and recommendations are presented in Section 5. 
2. Literature Review And Hypotheses  
2.1 CEO overconfidence level (CEOOF) 
 Previous studies have proved that managerial irrational behavior brings significant impact to corporate 
financing decisions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) confirm that overconfident managers may choose debt financing 
as preference in their leverage decision. Abor (2007) shows that optimistic CEOs exhibit a stronger relation between 
debt issue and financing deficit as compared to non-optimistic managers. Graham et al (2009) find consistent 
evidence where more optimistic CEOs prefer to use more short term debt. Equivalently, in China, Brick et al (2006) 
also agree overconfident managers prefer debt over equity financing. Consistently, Wei et al (2011) suggest that 
managerial irrationality, especially overconfidence does have a significantly positive effect on the financing 
decisions of firms in Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchange from 2002 to 2006. In contrast, Jing et al (2013) have 
found a different finding from their study. They conclude that overconfidence of entrepreneur may lead to lower 
corporate value, and it may also make the venture enterprise with a negative return from their investment. 
Therefore, H1: The presence of managerial overconfidence is significant affecting firm’s leverage decision. 
2.2 Age (AGE) 
Based on the UET, older CEOs are more risk averse and less aggressive than younger CEOs (Hambrick and 
Mason 1984). Consequently, they will prefer to choose internal funding as compared to external funding.  Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2003) explain that older CEOs who have an influence over the board of directors, might be less 
aggressive in financial policies because of that capability to do so. Serfling (2012) further agrees that firms with 
younger CEOs would invest more and have bigger growth opportunities. 
Hence, H2: CEO age is significantly negative related to firm’s leverage decision 
2.3 Education (EDU)  
According to the UET, CEO educational is reflected in the characteristics of their organizations (Orens and 
Reheul 2013). Based on the theory, higher educated CEOs are less risk averse, more open to new ideas, changes and 
investment opportunities (Barker and Mueller 2002). Rakhmayil and Yuce (2011) agree that higher education levels 
is significantly positive related to firm financial leveraging. 
Therefore, H3: The education level of CEO is significantly related to firm’s leverage decision. 
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2.4 Experience (EXP) 
The UET further explains that managerial decision making is also influenced by the leader’s prior experiences. 
Patzelt et al (2008) aruge that prior experience increases CEO’s knowledge of markets and it assists CEO to identify 
the opportunity. Fischer and Pollock (2004) further agree that the CEO’s previous experiences will enhance firm 
efficiency and survivorship. In other words, top managers’ expertise and background may bring significant impact 
to a firm strategy plan and decision making. 
Therefore, H4: The presence of CEO’s prior experience is significantly related to financial leverage decision. 
2.5 Gender (GEN) 
Apart from CEO duality, gender is another main variable to describe the characteristic of CEO. Abor and 
Biekpe (2007) argue that women-owned businesses are less likely to use debt for a variety of reasons, including 
discrimination and greater risk aversion. The result is consistent with Faccio et al (2012) who agree that firms run by 
female CEOs have lower leverage, less volatile earnings, and a higher chance of survival than firms run by male 
CEOs. 
Therefore, H5: CEO gender is significantly related to firm’s leverage decision. 
2.6 Tenure (TEN) 
By referring to the UET, CEO tenure plays significant role in decision making, specifially financial leverage 
decision. Hambrick et al. (1993) explain that new CEOs have a more external focus, and is expected to be more risk 
avrese in financing decision, thus, they prefer less debt. As tenure increases, CEOs become more confident and will 
take more challenges in their financing decision (Orens and Reheul 2013).  
Therefore, H6: There is a significantly relationship between CEO tenure and financial leverage decision. 
2.7 Network (NET) 
The UET further explains that external network enhances CEO experience. Well-networked CEOs have quicker 
access to relevant information from a network of contacts and it allows them to look for new business opportunites 
(Hoang and Antoncic 2003). 
Therefore, H7: The CEO network is significantly related to firm’s leverage decision. 
2.8 Founder (FOUND) 
Founder reflects functional tracks in the UET. BaronǦCohen et al (1999) agree that firm’s founder influence the 
firm’s strategy and operations. Fischer and Pollock (2004) claim that CEO founder’s involvement in the growth and 
success of a firm since its perception may motivate the CEO to derive the benefits of a firm. 
Therefore, H8: The presence of a founder-CEO is significantly related to firm’s leverage decision. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Source of Data 
Our sample covers all corporations listed in the Main Board of Bursa Malaysia (Stock Exchange of Malaysia) 
as at 30 September 2012. We delete firms from finance, insurance and unit trust companies due to differences in 
regulatory requirement. From 793 companies, we then screen through the data using the following criteria: (1) The 
firm has a complete data of 10 years period from 2002 to 2011. (2) The firm has a complete report on CEO personal 
characteristics needed as proxies’ measurement. After screening through the sample based on these two criteria, the 
final sample has 1,404 observations. All the financial data are from Datastream. CEO personal information such as 
profile photos, educational level, experiences, gender, network and past performance are collected by hand from 
company’s annual report.
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3.2 Variables measurement 
3.2.1 Independent variables 
Based on the UET, we propose different proxies as a measure of CEO personal characteristics. (a) CEOOF: We 
refer to CEO’s profile photo, four points if the CEOs photo in the annual report is equal to at least one half page in 
size; three points if it is less than one half in size; two points if there are other individuals pictured with the CEO; 
and one point it there is no photo of CEO (Schrand and Zechman 2012). (b) AGE: it is the numeric variable 
expressing age of an executive adjusted by year (Wei et al. 2011)). (c) EDU: We follow Rakhmayil and Yuce (2011) 
using scale ranges to distinguish the education level of CEO. The scale ranges from 1 to 7 to measure CEO 
education level as follows: 1 (did not graduate high school), 2 (graduated from high school), 3 (attended 
undergraduate school), 4 (earned undergraduate degree), 5(attended graduate school), 6(earned graduate degree), 
7(earned PhD/doctorate). (d) EXP: We use dummy variable for CEO experience which code as 1 if he or she served 
as a CO level executive (e.g., CEO, CFO, COO or CIO) or a vice president in another firm before he or she joined 
the firm under the study and 0 if otherwise. (e) GEN: We follow Abor (2007) for gender measurement and it is 
dummy variable, which code as 1 if firm male-owned and 0 if otherwise. (f) TEN: It is numeric variable which 
express number of years while CEO keeps the title in an analyzed company. (Wei et al., 2011). (g) NET: We follow 
Yang et al (2011) to measure CEO network by counting the number of corporate boards (other than the CEO’s own 
firm) on which CEO serves plus the number of nonprofit organizations of which the CEO serves as a trustee or 
board member. (h) FOUND: Is a dummy variable which code as 1 if the founder of the company is CEO at the time 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
3.2.2 Control variables 
Based on previous studies, we also identify few variables as control variables. (a) Ownership concentration 
(OC5): It is measured by dividing the sum of the shares held by the five largest shareholders with the top 30 
shareholders list in the company (Zeitun and Tian 2007, Nurul Afzan and Rashidah 2011). (b) Return on Assets 
(ROA): The study uses the value of the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Cao et al 2004). (c) 
Firm Size (SIZE): It is measured by the log of sales (Rajan and Zingales 2012).  
 
3.3 Research Model 
To examine the impact of CEO personal characteristics on financial leverage, we establish the research model 
as follow: 
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   
where Į is coefficients of the respective independent and control variables for the Model; Subscript i represents 
the cross-section dimension and t represents the time series component. LEVE is a measure of financial leverage and 
the study uses total debts to total assets to measure leverage. Standardized data are used in the panel regressions. 
4. Findings And Analysis 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis is shown in Table 1. The statistics reveals that 
Malaysian CEOs are having a confidence level of 1.539 out of 4 averagely. The age of Malaysian CEOs are 
averagely in between 51 to 52 years old. In terms of education level, the finding also indicates that Malaysian CEOs 
have earned at least undergraduate degree. The result also shows that 98.1% of Malaysian CEOs are male and 
generally they have been holding the CEO position for 11 to 12 years in the same company. In terms of networking, 
the results also point out Malaysian CEOs are not active in serving as a trustee or board member of non-profit 
organizations. Finally, most of the Malaysian CEOs are not founder of the company he or she served. However, 
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univariate test is weak in that it does not control for the variables used simultaneously in an empirical model. 
Therefore, we proceed and run multivariate regression analysis to provide a more robust test to evaluate whether 
CEO personal characteristics strengthens the relationship between leaders’ attributes and the level of leverage. 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variables Mean S.D. 
CEOOF 1.539 0.787 
AGE 51.655 8.410 
EDU 4.430 1.447 
EXP 0.266 0.442 
GEN 0.981 0.141 
TEN 11.774 8.831 
NET 1.264 1.991 
FOUND 0.181 0.385 
4.2 The Relation between CEO personal characteristics and Leverage 
Table 2 reports the results of our multiple regression analysis, using both pooled OLS and panel regression 
techniques. A multicollinearity test was conducted to check for correlation among the regressors. Setting the cut-off 
value for VIF at 5, we find no multicollinearity. Second, we check for heteroskedasticity of residuals using White 
test (White 1980) and the results suggest to use the White (White 1980)heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
to report our significance levels.
 
Using a pooled OLS regression, the empirical evidence depicts a significantly positive relationship between the 
CEOOF and leverage. This finding is consistent with Wei et al. (2011) indicating that when there is a greater 
confidence level of CEO in a company, the level of debt will be higher. The regression results also claim that CEOs 
educational levels are significantly positive related to leverage decision. Other than that, the coefficient on CEO age 
is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that elder CEOs tend to be more risk averse and thus taking less 
debt and it is consistent with Wei et al. (2011).  
 
Simple pooled OLS regression cannot adjust for firm-specific or time-specific effects. The fixed effect model 
(FEM) and random effect model (REM) can solve this problem. To determine a better model between FEM and 
REM, we conduct a Hausman Test (Greene and Hensher 2003, Wooldridge 2003). The Hausman test statistics 
suggest the use of FEM. The panel regression results in Table 2 show a consistent relationship between CEO age, 
CEO education and leverage, confirming that the younger and higher educated CEOs in companies will tend to 
choose higher debts in their leverage decision except for CEOOF. The results also show a negative coefficient on 
CEO experience and leverage at 99% confidence level. This could be explained as CEO’s previous experiences will 
enhance firm efficiency, survivorship and avoid financial distress position. Thus, they will tend to choose internal 
financing as compared to external financing. On the other hand, tenure is significantly positive related to financial 
leverage and it is consistent with the UET. As tenure increases, CEOs become more confident and will take more 
challenges in their leverage decision. All F-values are statistically significant at the 1% level, implying that the 
regression models are reliable for prediction. 
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        Table 2.  Regression results 
Pooled  FEM 
Variable Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Constant 0.367*** 3.162  0.576*** 3.440 
CEOOF 0.031** 2.465  -0.035** -1.863 
AGE -0.002** -1.773  -0.004** -1.924 
EDU 0.025*** 3.672  0.033*** 2.822 
EXP -0.037 -1.597  -0.176*** -4.676 
GEN -0.140 -2.124  0.027 0.297 
TEN 0.000 0.324  0.005** 1.706 
NET -0.007 -1.398  -0.003 -0.340 
FOUND 0.015 0.592  0.0024 0.019 
OC5 -0.079 -1.273  0.062 0.554 
ROA -1.040*** -12.392  -0.833** -10.377 
SIZE 0.019*** 2.937  -0.003 -0.239 
Hausman test 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.110 
 P < 0.05 
0.443 
F-statistic 14.043***  7.530*** 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
4.3 The Relation between CEO personal characteristics and leverage by grouping 
The results of the preceding sections suggest that AGE and EDU are significantly interacting CEO personal 
characteristics to financial leverage decision. To investigate this issue in detail, we adopt Ross et al (2012) to 
classify CEO’s age based on income generating potential and partition the sample into 3 groups which are; i) less 
than 46 years old; ii) 46 to 59 years old and;  iii) more than 59 years old. To ensure the robustness of the results, we 
run the regression test based on the three groups. Based on Table 3, the regression results claim that CEO 
confidence level and education background is significantly positive to firm leverage when CEO is 46 years old and 
above. In terms of experiences, regression result shows that when the age of CEO is reaching 46 and above, prior 
experience increases CEO’s knowledge in identifying business opportunity and they will tend to choose less debt in 
their business expansion. In regardless the age of CEO, the finding claims than female CEOs tend are a greater risk 
taker as compare male CEOs in Malaysia. 
 
Table 3. CEO Age Grouping 
 CEO Age < 46  CEO Age between 46-59  CEO age > 59 
Variable Coefficient t  Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Constant 0.811*** 3.460  0.168 1.557  0.474*** 2.708 
CEOOF 0.007 0.421  0.038*** 4.082  0.033** 2.484 
EDU 0.025*** 3.061  0.024 1.571  0.029*** 5.102 
EXP 0.220 1.603  -0.053*** -4.871  -0.047* -1.734 
GEN -0.472*** -3.327  -0.062** -2.078  -0.313*** -6.066 
TEN 0.000 0.161  0.000 -0.131  0.001 0.962 
NET 0.000 0.009  -0.006** -2.354  0.003 0.758 
FOUND 0.005 0.162  -0.028 -1.334  0.172*** 5.930 
OC5 -0.239*** -2.763  -0.124** -2.492  -0.017 -0.240 
ROA -0.382*** -2.946  -1.373*** -5.451  -0.140 -0.811 
SIZE 0.016 0.937  0.021 1.588  0.001 0.098 
Adjusted R2 0.116  0.149 0.103 
F-statistic 3.457***  13.721*** 3.240*** 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Following Romanelli (1989), we relate CEO’s aggressiveness based on level of education.  Hence, the study 
classifies CEO’s education level in 2 groups which are CEOs have an undergraduate degree and postgraduate 
degree. Based on Table 4, CEO with higher confidence level will prefer more debts when he or she obtains 
undergraduate degree. Contrary to it, CEO with higher confidence level will tend to be less aggressive in choosing 
debt as financing when he or she has a higher educational level. This is consistent with Bantel and Jackson (1989) 
who agree that highly educated top managers are positively related to strategic change in order to reduce company’s 
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risk for a better growth. An interesting finding here is well-networked CEO will tend to choose more debt when his 
or her highest education level is undergraduate degree. This could be explained as with a network of contacts, it 
allows CEO to manage firm’s transformation and take the challenges to go for more debt even lower educational 
level. Contrary to it, with a better external network, CEOs who earn at least postgraduate degree will prefer internal 
financing as compared to external financing.  
 
      Table 4. Education level Grouping 
 CEO has  Undergraduate degree 
 CEO has  
Postgraduate degree 
Variable Coefficient t  Coefficient t 
Constant 0.250*** 6.607  0.710*** 3.843 
CEOOF 0.043*** 5.212  -0.008** -2.539 
AGE -0.002*** -5.698  -0.004*** -6.105 
EXP 0.011 0.507  -0.027 -1.425 
GEN -0.035 -0.793  -0.093* -1.899 
TEN 0.003*** 4.217  0.001*** 5.502 
NET 0.007** 2.026  -0.014*** -6.317 
FOUND 0.003 0.281  -0.025** -2.438 
OC5 -0.019 -0.675  -0.214*** -4.756 
ROA -0.796*** -10.559  -0.900*** -3.154 
SIZE 0.017** 2.531  0.028** 2.560 
Adjusted R2 0.130  0.102 
F-statistic 12.613***  11.052*** 
Note: *, **, and *** denote the statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study examines the relationship between CEO personal characteristics and financial leverage for the period 
from 2002 to 2011. By classifying CEO certain characteristics (age and educational level) into groups, we evaluate 
the effects of CEO personal characteristics on financial leverage. The findings can be summarized as follows. (1) 
CEO overconfidence based on CEO profile photo is significantly and negatively related to leverage (fixed effect 
model); (2) CEO age is significantly and negatively related to leverage. (3) The higher the education, the higher the 
debts of a firm. (4) CEO prior experiences is significantly and negatively related to leverage; (5) CEO tenure is 
significantly and positively related to leverage; (6) In regardless the age of CEO, the finding claims than female 
CEOs tend are a greater risk taker as compare male CEOs in Malaysia; (7) Younger CEOs, female CEOs and longer 
serving CEOs are risk taker and more aggressive in regardless their educational background. 
 
Although the findings of this study may give policy makers an insight about the effects of CEO personal 
characteristics on financial leverage, we caution readers and investors that our measurement of CEO personal 
characteristics may have shortcomings. More direct measurements may be considered in the future. In addition, 
there may have been other incentives that we have not examined; we have shown that the most obvious (at least to 
us) possible CEO personal characteristics in determining leverage decision. One obvious future empirical extension 
to this study is to explore the effect of CEO perspective, CEO compensation and CEO race on cost of debt. It was 
also particularly time-consuming to hand collect the CEO information from the annual reports of our sample 
companies. 
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